Institutions, Exchange and Coordination

Regulation and technological change, in theory and in practice

About this lecture

In this second lecture, using the example of the evolution in the 1990s from the vertically-integrated firm into competitive wholesale power markets in the US, Professor Kiesling discusses how digital technology lowers transaction costs, shifting organizational structure from vertical integration to markets/contracts.

References

Ronald Coase (1937), “The Nature of the Firm,” TKTK

Jean-Michel Glachant & Dominique Finon (2003), Competition in European Electricity Markets (Edward Elgar)

Paul Joskow (2005), “Vertical Integration,” in Menard & Shirley, eds., Handbook of New Institutional Economics (Springer)

Peter Klein (2005), “The Make or Buy Decision: Lessons From Empirical Studies,” Handbook of New Institutional Economics (Springer)

Klein, Crawford, & Alchian (1978), “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Contracting Process,” Journal of Law & Economics vol. 21

Part of the IOE ecosystem

Governance and Regulation Chair, Université Paris-Dauphine – PSL Institutional & Organizational Economics Academy Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics