A Theory of Stateless Commerce

Description

This video lecture explains why stateless commerce arises and persists. Why are mechanisms that were relied upon in the fifteenth-century merchant fairs still being used in twenty-first-century New York? Why do pre-modern modes of organization remain when much of the world has embraced, and relies upon, modern state-sponsored instruments to support commercial exchange?

References

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