An initiative of the Governance & Regulation Chair · Université Paris-Dauphine – PSL

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Political and Institutional Dynamics

Regulatory Policy Decisions and Implications for Political Strategy

Rick Vanden Bergh Professor of Strategy, Grossman School of Business, University of Vermont

About this lecture

In this final video of the series, Professor Vanden Bergh will explore a more complex policy making process where multiple political institutions interact to determine policy. In particular, he will analyze regulatory policy decisions in a context where elected politicians can overturn their decisions. He concludes by discussing the implications of this model for political strategy.
political strategychecks and balancespivotal institutions

References

Vanden Bergh, R. G., & Holburn, G. L. (2007). Targeting corporate political strategy: Theory and evidence from the US accounting industry. Business and Politics, 9(2), 1-31.

Bonardi, J. P., Holburn, G. L., & Vanden Bergh, R. G. (2006). Nonmarket strategy performance: Evidence from US electric utilities. Academy of Management Journal, 49(6), 1209-1228.

Holburn, G. L., & Vanden Bergh, R. G. (2000). Policy and process: A game-theoretic framework for the design of non-market strategy. In The New Institutionalism in Strategic Management (pp. 33-66). Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

Holburn, G. L., & Vanden Bergh, R. G. (2004). Influencing agencies through pivotal political institutions. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 20(2), 458-483.

Holburn, G. L., & Vanden Bergh, R. G. (2008). Making friends in hostile environments: Political strategy in regulated industries. Academy of Management Review, 33(2), 521-540.

Part of the IOE ecosystem

Governance and Regulation Chair, Université Paris-Dauphine – PSL Institutional & Organizational Economics Academy Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics